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Abstract
Economic institutions determine prospects for growth and devel-
opment. This paper examines necessary conditions for an economy
to support institutions that implement markets. Agents diﬀer in land
holdings, skill, and power. A competitive market assigns land to the
skilled, not necessarily to the powerful. Therefore a market allocation
needs to be robust to coalitional expropriation. In a dynamic set-
ting, market payoﬀs may induce suﬃcient inequality in next period’s
endowments for markets to alternate with expropriation in a limit cy-
cle, decreasing eﬃciency and amplifying macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
Long run stability of markets is favored by higher social mobility, more
initial equality, and less mismatch between demand and supply.
Keywords: Expropriation, market institutions, inequality, ﬂuctua-
tions, coalition formation.
JEL: E02, O43, C71.
1 Introduction
The quality of institutions interferes with the ability of markets to success-
fully assign scarce goods to individuals who can put them to their most
productive use. Hence, as has been noted by North (1991) and a corre-
sponding literature, institutions determine prospects for economic growth
∗The authors are grateful for valuable comments and discussion to three anonymous
referees, Matthias Dahm, Dilip Mookherjee, Dani Rodrik, Heinrich Ursprung, participants
of Silvaplana Workshop 2006, ESEM, NEUDC, SAE (all in 2007), NASMES 2009, Vere-
instagung 2010 and the Political Economy and Development Seminar 2010 at PSE, and of
seminars at Boston University, MPI Bonn, LMU Munich, Namur, Pisa and WZB Berlin.
The usual disclaimer applies. A previous version has been circulated under the title “A
Tale of Markets and Jungles in a Simple Model of Growth”.
†Corresponding author. Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee
24-42, 53113 Bonn, Germany; email: tgall@uni-bonn.de
‡University of Mannheim, Germany; email: pmasella@rumms.uni-mannheim.de
1and development, for instance by way of the organization of production. In-
deed, there appears to be some empirical support for this hypothesis (see e.g.
Acemoglu et al., 2001, Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2002, Rodrik et al., 2004).
Institutions typically comprise a host of diverse issues such as the legal
and political framework, judicial enforcement, quality of bureaucracy, or so-
cial norms. Not only do these aﬀect economic interaction diﬀerentially, but
also the eﬀects may interlink. The literature so far has focused on mod-
eling particular, mostly political, institutions such as elections and voting
on redistribution or public spending, for instance on legal institutions and
law enforcement, or state capacity.1 The correct set of institutions to be in-
cluded in a model is, however, not obvious. Enforcement of property rights
and economic prosperity, for instance, have been observed under a variety of
political institutions (see Glaeser et al., 2004); the authoritarian regimes in
Chile, Singapore, and South Korea are cases in point. Mulligan et al. (2004)
report no systematic economic or social policy diﬀerences between democra-
cies and (non-communist) non-democracies across countries over the years
1960-90.2.
This paper pursues an alternative approach in focusing on whether eco-
nomic outcomes are implementable, or stable, in a society, remaining ag-
nostic about the particular mix of institutions employed to this end. An
outcome is understood to be stable if it is robust to deviations by arbitrary
coalitions of agents. Hence, the precise nature of interactions between dif-
ferent institutions of political, social, legal or economic kind need not be
modeled. Whether an eﬃcient market allocation can be reached will de-
pend on the distribution of power in a society; more equality or congruence
of power and economic resources favor markets. Otherwise a jungle emerges:
an outcome that assigns all land to an elite of the most powerful distorting
the economic allocation; this is the only cost of expropriation in this model.
Yet the main contribution is to examine the dynamic behavior of such
an economy, characterized by the bidirectional feedback between economic
outcomes and the distribution of power. This is especially relevant when
one seeks to explain macroeconomic phenomena such as output volatility,
institutional or election cycles, or poverty traps. Such interaction occurs
when individual power depends on parental income in that both the jungle
1See among others Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Acemoglu (2006), Acemoglu et al.
(2005), Besley and Persson (2009), Cervellati et al. (2006, 2009), Galor et al. (2009), Grad-
stein (2004, 2007). It has been emphasized recently, e.g. by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008)
and Rajan (2009), that other types of institutions also aﬀect the economic allocation.
2On the other hand, Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) ﬁnd that governance, measured by a
rule of law index, is partially explained by a democracy indicator.
2and, to a lesser degree, the market concentrate land in the hands of the pow-
erful. Moreover, income inequality of an eﬃcient market allocation aﬀects
long run stability: when market payoﬀs induce suﬃcient power inequality
and thus a jungle in the next period, the market outcome is not a steady
state. That is, the market may contain the seed of its own undoing.
To address these issues we use a simple dynamic model of non-overlapping
generations. Agents diﬀer in land holdings, skill, and power. Skill is indi-
vidual productivity with land, and power the extent to which individuals
contribute to enforce particular allocations. Power may be thought of as
physical power, wealth, or status. Agents are endowed with power; it does
not depend on later consumption (as it does in Acemoglu et al., 2008b,
2009), but may depend on parental power and income. The economic prob-
lem consists of the organization of production, i.e. in whether land goes to
the skilled, which maximizes surplus, or to the powerful. Indeed the pres-
ence of land markets that yield a competitive outcome plays an important
role in economic development.3
Outcomes are given by the land allocation and the price (if any) that
is paid for land. This encompasses both the Walrasian market equilibrium
allocation and any redistribution of land to coalitions of agents. That is, we
consider competitive markets and coalitional expropriation of input factors.4
As a solution concept we use the largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994). It con-
tains all outcomes that can be supported as a status quo against deviations
by farsighted agents, capturing our notion of stability.5
An outcome that assigns all land to the most powerful, the jungle, domi-
nates all other forms of coalitional expropriation. Versions of this assignment
mechanism appear in the literature: e.g. the equilibrium in the jungle (Pic-
cione and Rubinstein, 2007), the pillage game (Jordan, 2006), or the dog
bone economy (Sattinger, 1993). They model expropriation of consump-
tion, not considering a market as an alternative mechanism. Our focus lies
3See for instance Deininger and Feder (2001). Rajan and Zingales (2003) discuss ex-
tensively the importance of the rise of land markets for the British Economy in the XVI
century. Evidence from China reported in Carter et al. (1996), Rozelle et al. (1996),
Yao (1996) suggest that higher levels of transfer rights increase investment and improve
allocation of labor therefore enhancing the total level of eﬃciency of the economy.
4The essential characteristic of expropriation is a deﬁcit to commit to remunerate
agents not among the expropriating coalition. This can also be understood as a failure
to make tenants residual claimants, or a lack of commitment not to appropriate proﬁts,
both leading to underinvestment (see e.g. Besley and Ghatak, 2009).
5Also Acemoglu et al. (2009) use a version of the largest consistent set and give a non-
cooperative foundation, not admitting production, power evolution, or Condorcet cycles.
3on factor expropriation and distortions of the organization of production.6
The jungle also shares features with a rent-seeking outcome.
In the long run two distinct patterns may emerge. Allocation by markets
can be a stable outcome in every period (similar to the unique limit outcome
in Cervellati et al., 2008); that is, markets are sustainable. This is facilitated
by more equal initial period power distributions and less mismatch between
demand and supply. Otherwise periods when a market allocation is stable
alternate with periods when it is not, i.e. there is a limit cycle. This is
because a jungle assigns power and economic resources to the elite, removing
the elite’s motive to expropriate input factors in the next period. Depending
on the distribution of market rents, in a limit cycle elites may be persistent
as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) or they may not.
Whether institutions that permit allocation of resources to reach a mar-
ket outcome are sustainable in the long run depends on a society’s ability
to absorb income inequality in a market outcome. Market payoﬀs play a
twofold role in driving power inequality: on the one hand they redistribute
power through the skill premium, which is independently drawn, and thus
tends to compress the power distribution. On the other hand, they allow
power accumulation by sellers of resources through the land price, creating
powerful proﬁteers from a future jungle. Moreover, the way power transmits
across generations has a profound eﬀect. If power diﬀerentials do not persist
over generations, for instance in meritocratic societies, markets are sustain-
able regardless of other parameters; that is, an ergodicity result holds. If
individual power depends on the entire lineage’s history, for instance in a
caste society, a limit cycle may emerge, causing distortions of the organiza-
tion of production resulting in lower and more volatile output in the long
run than when markets are sustainable. Hence, the model is able to ex-
plain long run diﬀerences in total factor productivity across countries (cf.
Prescott, 1998, Banerjee and Moll, 2010).
The results are consistent with a number of empirical observations.
Higher growth rate volatility appears to be linked to inequality (Berg et al.,
2008, Breen and Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa, 2005), presence of social conﬂict (Ro-
drik, 1999), and institutions proxied by settler mortality (Acemoglu et al.,
2003). The dependence on initial power distributions resembles the ﬁnding
in Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2006), when colonial initial land allocations in
European hands can be interpreted as a proxy for the initial distribution
of power. Acemoglu et al. (2008a) report that a measure of inequality of
6Incorporating both and analyzing possible interdependencies is, though desirable, be-
yond the scope of the present paper and left to future research.
4political power relates negatively to economic development in Colombia.
This paper is related to a ﬁeld of literature studying equilibrium out-
comes in environments of conﬂict or rent seeking, when market outcomes
are precluded.7 These papers tend to emphasize waste of resources used to
prepare and ﬁght conﬂicts or engage in rent seeking. We abstract from such
cost and admit the possibility of economic institutions such as enforceable
contracts when suﬃciently powerful agents support the resulting allocation.
A second, related strand of literature studies the relationship between
inequality and growth. There inequality aﬀects economic organization and
eﬃciency through occupational and, in particular, political choice, determin-
ing prospects for growth.8 We are interested in the underlying conditions
enabling a society to support market outcomes regardless of the particular
mechanism employed to implement the allocation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the static framework
and section 3 the analysis of its equilibrium. In section 4 we present the
dynamic model. Section 5 discusses possible extensions. Section 6 concludes,
and all proofs not in the text are in the appendix.
2 Static Framework
2.1 Agents
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents I, which is a compact
subset of the real line endowed with unit Lebesgue measure. Agents live for
one period only. An agent i ∈ I is fully characterized by the tuple (θi,λi,ωi),
representing productivity, or skill, θi, land holding λi, and power ωi. An
agent’s productivity is high, θi = H, with exogenous probability s ∈ (0,1)
and low, θi = L, otherwise. Productivities are distributed independently.
An agent either holds a unit of land, λi = 1, or not, λi = 0.9 Aggregate land
endowment in the economy is given by ℓ ∈ (0,1). Denote by G(ω,λ) the
joint distribution of power and land, and by F(ω) the marginal distribution
with respect to power. We will frequently use G(ω,1) (G(ω,0)), giving the
measure of agents weaker than ω who are (not) endowed with land. Let
7See for instance Bhagwati (1982), Gonzalez (2007), Grossman (1991, 2001), Hafer
(2006), Krueger (1974), Muthoo (2004), Olson (1982), Tornell (1997).
8Examples for the former are Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993); see
for instance Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Grossman (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994),
Alesina and Perotti (1996) for the latter.
9Land can also be interpreted as a capital good that neither depreciates nor accumu-
lates, or, in the short run, as access to occupations or licences.
5F(.) be atom-less and bounded below and above by ω and ω. Agents derive
linear utility from consumption of income yi, u(yi) = yi.
2.2 Production
The economy produces a single consumption good. This occurs either using
a subsistence technology requiring labor but not land, or using a compos-
ite technology that requires both labor and land. To save on notation let
r(θi,λi) denote individual i’s revenue from working λi units of land given
productivity θi. Suppose that
r(H,1) − r(H,0) > r(L,1) − r(L,0) > 0 and
r(H,1) > r(L,1) ≥ r(H,0) ≥ r(L,0) ≥ 0,
so that output using land is always greater than when not using it, and
skilled H agents’ return from land is higher than that of the unskilled.
Output in the economy thus depends on the allocation of land and skill;
redistributing land endowments to match the skill distribution, for instance
through markets, increases output.
2.3 Timing
The timing of the model is the following:
- at stage 0 agents are born and nature draws types,
- at stage 1 land is assigned to agents,
- at stage 2 production and payoﬀs take place.10
Since individual land holding may change, denote by λ0 the allocation
of land endowments (in stage 0), and by λ the allocation of land after redis-
tribution by some assignment mechanism in stage 1.11
2.4 Assignment of Land
The main economic concern in this model is the assignment of land to agents.
That is, whether – given an initial endowment distribution of power and land
10That is, markets open only once, which precludes debt or rental contracts, and expro-
priation occurs before production. Letting markets and production open multiple times
each period is beyond the present approach.
11As a convention we use λ as an abbreviation for (λi)i∈I to indicate the land allocation,
while λi denotes individual i’s land holding.
6– land will be allocated based on a competitive spot market or occur through
coalitional expropriation. In a spot market agents can contract on exchanges
of land for labor, so that a competitive equilibrium allocation of land and
labor is reached. On the other hand, land may be assigned by coalitional
expropriation, reassigning land endowments to members of some coalition.
Competitive Spot Market for Land
The production technology implies that given the initial land allocation
there are gains from trade prior to production. Therefore there are prices
in units of the consumption good to ensure that both (H,0,.) agents are
willing to buy and (L,1,.) agents are willing to sell land. Producing the
required amount of the consumption good requires the buyer to exert labor
eﬀort so that in eﬀect land is exchanged for labor. This is best interpreted as
tenants who work the land until they are able to buy out their landlords.12
Determine now the competitive market outcome. Agent i’s valuation for
land is u(r(θi,1)) − u(r(θi,0)). Given utility function u(yi) = yi, demand
for land at price p is given by agents with r(θi,1) − r(θi,0) ≥ p and supply
by agents with r(θi,1) − r(θi,0) ≤ p. Suppose that ℓ ̸= s (the case ℓ = s is
a convex combination of the other two and not particularly enlightening),
then the market price for land is
p =
{
r(H,1) − r(H,0) := pH if s > ℓ
r(L,1) − r(L,0) := pL if s < ℓ.
13 (1)
In the market equilibrium land allocation λM = (λM
i )i∈I all possible matches
between high skill and land are realized. Suppose that land is rationed
uniformly among indiﬀerent agents. An agent i obtains payoﬀ
u(λ0
i,θi,λM
i ,p) = r(θi,λM




i denotes land endowment and λM
i land in the market outcome.
Denote a Walrasian market allocation in this economy by W(λ0). W(λ0) is
given by an allocation ((λM
i )i∈I,p) such that
θi = H ⇒ λM
i = 1 if s < ℓ and θi = L ⇒ λM
i = 0 if s > ℓ, (2)
12Another interpretation is that the buyer pays by installments; this requires enforce-
ability of a relational loan contract between seller and buyer, or access to suﬃciently
developed capital markets.
13Note that in more general setups, e.g. allowing for risk aversion or costly eﬀort provi-
sion, typically p
 < r(θ,1)   r(θ,0), θ 2 fL;Hg.
7and an associated market price p given by (1). Agents’ payoﬀs are completely
determined by the initial land distribution λ0 and measures s and ℓ. Note
that W(λ0) does not pin down a unique land allocation, since agents on the
longer market side are indiﬀerent between buying and selling. All allocations
in W(λ0) are, however, payoﬀ equivalent.
Coalitional Expropriations
As outlined above any allocation of land that provides measure ℓ of agents
with one unit of land can be interpreted as coalitional expropriation, i.e.
a coalition of measure ℓ appropriates all land assigning one unit to each
member. Denote an allocation resulting from coalitional expropriation by
(λ,p) = ((λi)i∈I,0). Note that the market allocation of land may be reached
by coalitional expropriation, although p = 0, since land is expropriated and
no labor is exchanged for land. This setup remains silent on the exact
means of expropriation; it is consistent with violent theft, or discrimination
codiﬁed in law or laid down in social norms that takes place in actual mar-
ket places. We abstract from transaction cost so that agents’ payoﬀs are
revenues r(θi,λi).
2.5 Admissible Allocations
We limit our attention to allocations that are induced by a Walrasian market
equilibrium or coalitional expropriation. This ignores market allocations
with non-Walrasian prices inducing some form of rationing. Deﬁne the set
of admissible of allocations accordingly as follows.




i∈I λidi = ℓ and λi ∈ {0;1} for all i ∈ I (feasibility) and
(ii) either p = 0 or it is a Walrasian allocation, i.e. (λ,p) ∈ W(λ0).
Deﬁnition 1 contains three important assumptions. First, redistribution
does not waste resources. This is because we focus on allocative distortions
as a consequence of expropriation rather than on waste. Second, only de-
terministic redistribution is considered.14 Third, since labor eﬀort provision
14Admitting stochastic redistribution requires commitment to enforce the outcome, see
Section 5.1. Moreover, when capital market frictions are severe, stochastic expropriation
may yield higher output than assignment by markets (e.g. Gall, 2008, pursues this point).
8cannot be forced, for instance due to lack of observability, we consider al-
locations that result from voluntary exchanges of labor for land on a spot
market, but we do not consider allocations requiring gifts or forced labor.
2.6 Solution Concept
Our aim is to identify a resource allocation that is robust to potential coali-
tional deviations to other admissible allocations. Given such an allocation
production takes place, which in turn determines agents’ payoﬀs. Agent i’s
payoﬀ from an allocation (λ,p) is
u(λ0
i,θi,λi,p) = r(θi,λi) − (λi − λ0
i)p.
We model coalitional deviations as a move to another admissible allocation
enforced by a coalition preferring the new allocation met with opposition by
a coalition preferring the status quo. Given an allocation (λb,pb) there is a
coalitional deviation to an allocation (λa,pa) if there is a power majority of
agents that strictly prefers (λa,pa) to (λb,pb). In the spirit of von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944) we say (λa,pa) dominates (λb,pb).
Denition 2 (Dominance) An allocation (λa,pa) dominates an alloca-




i∈C′ ωidi where C =










Hence, an allocation a dominates an allocation b, if strict winners un-
der a (coalition C) have greater aggregate power than strict losers under
a (coalition C′). C and C′ are uniquely determined by the payoﬀs in the
respective allocations. Strict preference is required, since coalition members
may need to communicate and coordinate. Introducing a small but positive
coordination cost thus does not alter the results, and our setup is consis-
tent with both the use of force to switch allocations and non-violent regime
change. To familiarize the reader with the concept suppose a = W(λ0) and
b = (λ0,0). If W(λ0) ̸= (λ0,p), the competitive allocation dominates the
endowment allocation, that is a ≻ b. This is because C′ = ∅ as trade is vol-
untary, and, since θi is drawn independently, a positive measure of agents
has strict gains from trade, so that C ̸= ∅.
As noted by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), transitivity of the
relation ≻ is not guaranteed. Indeed transitivity may fail in our setup,
implying that the core is empty and a stable set does not exist, see the
appendix for an example. Therefore we use an appropriate version of the
9largest consistent set introduced by Chwe (1994). This requires deﬁning the
relation indirect (or farsighted) dominance.
Denition 3 (Indirect Dominance) Allocation (λa,pa) indirectly domi-
nates allocation (λb,pb), that is (λa,pa)   (λb,pb), if there exist admissible
(λ1,p1), (λ2,p2), ..., (λm,pm) (where (λ1,p1) = (λa,pa) and (λm,pm) =
(λb,pb)) such that for every j = 2,...,m (λj−1,pj−1) ≻ (λj,pj) and (λ1,1 ) ⊀
(λj,pj).
That is, for allocation a to indirectly dominate allocation b there must
be a sequence of allocations starting at b, such that each element in the
sequence (i) directly dominates each predecessor if there is one and (ii) does
not dominate the ﬁnal allocation a.15 Intuitively, at each step a power
majority must be willing to change allocation, while there must not be a
power majority preferring the present allocation over the ﬁnal allocation and
thus willing to veto the re-allocation. Deﬁne consistent sets accordingly.
Denition 4 (Consistent Set) A set of admissible allocations Y is con-
sistent if (λa,pa) ∈ Y if and only if for all admissible (λb,pb) with (λb,pb) ≻
(λa,pa) there exists (λc,pc) ∈ Y where (λc,pc) (λb,pb) such that (λa,pa) ⊀
(λc,pc). Deﬁne the largest consistent set ¯ Y as a consistent set with Y ⊆ ¯ Y
for all consistent Y . An allocation (λ,p) is said to be stable if it is in the
largest consistent set, (λ,p) ∈ ¯ Y .
Consistency requires that any deviation from an allocation a in the con-
sistent set to another allocation b dominating a in turn enables a deviation
to another allocation c that (indirectly) dominates b and is in the consistent
set, but does not dominate a. Intuitively, for any deviation from alloca-
tions in the consistent set agents anticipate to return to an allocation in the
consistent set not dominating the original allocation. Thus the deviation is
deterred. ¯ Y is then the largest set of admissible allocation that is consistent
and therefore encompasses all allocations supportable as stable outcomes.
A particular concern is whether a Walrasian market allocation is in the
largest consistent set, since this ensures that when it is the status quo po-
tential deviations can be credibly deterred. A society may attempt to im-
plement a market outcome by way of choosing adequate institutions, for
instance a promise to enforce property rights and a free market economy,
15In contrast to Chwe (1994) we only require the ﬁnal allocation to be undominated.
Here the dominance relation relies on all winners and losers, and requires relative power
majority. Requiring strict dominance of the ﬁnal allocation thus means that indirect
implies direct dominance and a consistent set need not exist, see appendix for an example.
10encoded in political or legal institutions such as a constitution. Yet such a
promise of enforcement is credible only when the outcome allocation is in the
largest consistent set. Otherwise it is vulnerable to coalitional deviations,
implying that institutions will necessarily erode.
3 Static Equilibrium
3.1 Coalitional Expropriation: the Jungle Emerges
Although the largest consistent set is non-empty under weak conditions, ex-
istence is not straightforward, since our dominance relation only uses relative
power majority. This section provides an existence result.
Start by characterizing the economy’s elite as measure ℓ of the most
powerful agents. That is, if power endowments change over time, so do
identities of agents among the elite. An agent i is among the elite of strong
agents, if ωi > ˆ ω, with the cutoﬀ power endowment ˆ ω deﬁned implicitly by
1 − F(ˆ ω) = ℓ.
Let (λJ,0) denote an admissible allocation that assigns land to the elite, i.e.
λJ
i = 1 if ωi > ˆ ω and λJ
i = 0 if ωi < ˆ ω. A useful result follows immediately.
Proposition 1 (Expropriation) The allocation (λJ,0) is unique almost
everywhere and undominated by all admissible allocations (λ′,0).
The proof (in the appendix) is straightforward, using that for each allo-
cation (λ,0) ̸= (λJ,0) some members of the elite do not hold land, but are
more powerful than some landholders in allocation (λ,0). Hence, there is a
unique land allocation λJ not dominated by any coalitional redistribution.
This allocation is characterized by expropriation of the weak by the strong,
that is the economy becomes a jungle. There are several reasons for singling
out the jungle among a continuum of admissible coalitional expropriations.
First, no coordination is required. Second, it assigns land only by power
(contrary to the market, which assigns land by skill only). Third, it has
become a recurrent theme in the literature under various guises.16
16For instance, it coincides with the jungle equilibrium outcome in Piccione and Ru-
binstein (2007) and the dog bone economy allocation in Sattinger (1993), and is in the
outcome set of a version of the pillage game equilibrium in Jordan (2006).
113.2 Stable Outcomes in the Static Economy
Let us now determine whether a market allocation (λM,p) ∈ W(λ0) can be
a stable outcome, i.e. be in the largest consistent set. Since by Proposi-
tion 1 the jungle dominates all other coalitional expropriation outcomes,
(λJ,0) ≻ (λM,p) implies ¯ Y = (λJ,0). That is, if the jungle outcome
dominates a market outcome it is the largest consistent set. The oppo-
site, ¯ Y = (λM,p) (i.e. the market outcome is the largest consistent set)
holds if (λM,p) ≻ (λ,0) for all coalitional expropriations (λ,0) including
the jungle. This case is not implied by (λM,p) ≻ (λJ,0), however, and
there may be some coalitional expropriation outcome (λ,0) ≻ (λM,p), while
(λM,p) ≻ (λJ,0), and the relation ≻ is not transitive (see appendix for an
example). Nevertheless the following proposition states that in this case
the market allocation is in the largest consistent set and can therefore be
supported as a stable outcome.
Proposition 2 If (λM,p) ≻ (λJ,0), where (λM,p) ∈ W(λ0), a market for
land is stable, (λM,p) ∈ ¯ Y . Otherwise only a jungle allocation is stable,
¯ Y = (λJ,0).
The full proof is in the appendix, but a sketch follows. If ≻ is not
transitive, continuity of the measure of the agent space implies existence
of a coalitional expropriation outcome (λX,0) with (λM,p) ⊀ (λX,0) and
(λX,0) ⊀ (λM,p). Then all three allocations are in the largest consistent
set, with the jungle deterring potential deviations from markets, and (λX,0)
deterring a deviation from the jungle to markets, to enable the jungle as an
element in the consistent set to be used as a deterrent.
Hence, whether land markets are stable, that is whether a society can
support Walrasian allocations, depends only on the dominance relation be-
tween the market and the jungle. (λM,p) ≻ (λJ,0) implies that all admis-
sible allocations are either directly or indirectly dominated by (λM,p). A
discussion of conditions implying that (λM,p) is the unique stable outcome
is postponed to the next section. Determine now conditions for (λM,p) ≻
(λJ,0) using the deﬁnition of ≻. Two cases arise depending on the market


















ωdG(ω,0) if p = pH. (4)
12That is, a market allocation is stable if the aggregate power of the winners
from markets (LHS) exceeds the one of the losers from markets (RHS). Weak
agents endowed with land (ωi < ˆ ω and λ0
i = 1) always support markets, since
they are expropriated in the jungle. Moreover, agents who realize gains
from trade support markets. Their identity depends on the market price p.
When the land price is low, weak skilled buyers (θi = H and λ0
i = 0) obtain
rents and support markets, see condition (3). If the market price is high, all
unskilled sellers (θi = L and λ0
i = 1) obtain rents on the market and support
markets, see condition (4). The RHS of both conditions captures the power
of strong agents not endowed with land (ωi > ˆ ω and λ0
i = 0). They strictly
prefer expropriation, since they obtain land for free in the jungle.
3.3 Properties of the Stable Outcome
Some observations are worth mentioning at this point. Whether a market
is stable depends on the mismatch between demand and supply in the mar-
ket and on properties of the joint distribution of land and power such as
inequality or correlation. Lower mismatch between demand and supply is
associated with more support for market allocations, because the power of
either weak skilled buyers or strong unskilled sellers increases.
Moreover, a more equal power distribution favors stability of markets,
because more equality decreases the power of strong agents without land and
increases the power of weak agents with land. The eﬀect of more equality
is less pronounced in a high price environment, since it also decreases the
power of unskilled strong landholders who support markets.
Finally, correlation of land and power plays an important role. Suppose
for a moment that the most powerful agents hold land (i.e. λ0
i = 1 ⇔
ωi > ˆ ω) and thus land and power are perfectly correlated. Then the market
allocation is a stable outcome (indeed the only one), as the RHS of the
appropriate condition (3) or (4) is zero, while some agents have strict gains
from trade, so that the LHS of the respective condition is strictly positive.
This is particularly relevant if one is interested in the dynamics, as the
jungle assigns land only to the powerful, inducing perfect correlation of end
of period power, land holdings, and income.
This reasoning extends to more general cases. Formalize the correlation
between land and power by deﬁning binary variables P(i) returning 1 if
agent i is member of the power elite (i.e. ωi ≥ ˆ ω) and 0 otherwise, and
13L(i) = λ0






describes congruence of land and power in the endowment distribution. In-
deed suﬃcient congruence stabilizes markets, as stated in the following sum-
mary proposition (details can be found in the appendix).
Proposition 3 Properties of the stable outcome:
(i) When s > ℓ (s < ℓ) a decrease (increase) of s favors markets as a
stable outcome, i.e. (λM,p) ∈ ¯ Y .
(ii) Suppose that ω < ˆ ω, i.e. the distribution of power is non-degenerate for
ω ≤ ˆ ω, and the jungle is the only stable outcome ((λJ,0) ≻ (λM,p)).
Then there is a redistribution of power from the strong (ωi > ˆ ω) to the
weak (ωi < ˆ ω) favoring stability of market allocations.
(iii) There is ϵ > 0 such that for all ρ ≥ 1 − ϵ a market allocation is the
stable outcome.
4 Dynamic Setting
Consider now a dynamic version of the model outlined above. Each gener-
ation of agents lives for a single period. In a period t agents are born and
nature draws types, then land is assigned, ﬁnally production takes place
and output is consumed, as above. Each agent has a single child. Absent
investment generations are linked by land bequests and intergenerational
spill-overs of power and income. As land does not depreciate, parents leave
their land to their oﬀspring. The power of an agent’s oﬀspring is potentially
determined both by the parent’s power and income, obeying the rule
ωi,t+1 = αωi,t + βyi,t + η, (5)
where α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0 and η ≥ 0. This law of motion merits some explanation.
It states that agents’ power is an aggregate of their parent’s power and
income, and an exogenous common component. This allows for a number
of interpretations.
First, power may be thought of as wealth (measured in units of the
consumption good). Suppose that wealth can be invested or stored, yielding
return R ≥ 0, and agents’ preferences exhibit some form of warm glow; for
instance, let agents’ utility from consumption c and bequest b be u(c,b) =
14cδb1−δ. Then utility is linear in the level of wealth accumulated by the agent
at the end of a period and in each period t an agent’s wealth endowment is
given by ωt = δ(Rωt−1 + yt−1), that is α = δR, β = δ, and η = 0.
Power may also be viewed as social status of a dynasty acquired through
ancestors’ income. Individual status could depend on parental economic
success, i.e. income, and parents’ status. This can be captured by the law




ωj;t−1, decreases in η, and for η large enough the power distribution
is compressed over time, so that social stratiﬁcation diminishes. As η grows
out of bounds social status does not play a role; conversely, when α > 0 and
β = η = 0 the power ranking does not vary over time, which can be thought
of as a feudal society. Hence, η is best interpreted as social mobility in this
setting.
Finally, power may be interpreted as a physical characteristic, such as
leadership, cunning or strength. It is then natural to assume that the current
generation’s phenotypical attribute is given by a common endowment η that
is aﬀected by nature (the parent’s attribute), and by nurture (e.g. early
childhood investment, which correlate with parental income when preference
exhibit warm glow as above). In this interpretation ωt = αωt−1 +βyt−1 +η,
where α > 0, β > 0 , and η > 0.17
In all cases α measures the persistence of power, β the impact of con-
temporaneous income shocks, and η is a mobility component. The case
β > 0 is of particular interest as then economic outcomes aﬀect the future
distribution of power and thus future economic institutions.
Proposition 2 ensures that always the jungle or the market is a stable
outcome of the static model. As multiple allocations may be in the largest
consistent set, select in this case the allocation that is implied by the assign-
ment mechanism generating the previous period’s allocation. That is, the
status quo assignment mechanism is selected whenever it can be justiﬁed as
stable. Deﬁne a period equilibrium allocation by the allocation of the status
quo assignment mechanism if it is in the largest consistent set, otherwise by
the unique stable allocation. This is well-deﬁned as only expropriation or
the market allocation can be unique stable allocations, and both are stable
in case of multiple stable allocations. To close the model let the jungle be
the status quo in period 0.
17Interpreting power as the number of votes an individual is endowed with also yields
the same expression. The case where the law of motion, or parameters thereof, is directly
chosen by a society is likely to provide interesting future research.
154.1 Transition Functions
Key to the model’s long run dynamics is the mapping of period t’s joint
distribution of land and power into period t + 1’s joint distribution of land
and power. This mapping is well deﬁned since under our selection rule an
equilibrium allocation fully determines next period’s endowments through
the consumption spill-over and the bequest of land.
Income in a jungle outcome is either r(θi,1) if ωi,t ≥ ˆ ωt, or r(θi,0)
otherwise. Power in period t + 1 is then
ωi,t+1 = αωi,t + η + β
{
r(θi,1) if ωi,t ≥ ˆ ωi,t
r(θi,0) if ωi,t < ˆ ωi,t.
Since land goes to the powerful, the land endowment in period t + 1 is
λi,t+1 =
{
1 if ωi,t ≥ ˆ ωi,t
0 if ωi,t < ˆ ωi,t.
Note that in the jungle ωi,t > ˆ ωi,t implies ωi,t+1 > ˆ ωi,t+1. Therefore land
and power are perfectly correlated in t + 1.
In a market income is r(θi,1) if an agent owns land at the beginning and
at the end of the period, r(θi,0) if he never owns land, r(θi,1)−p if he buys
and r(θi,0) + p if he sells. Hence, power in period t + 1 is
ωi,t+1 = αωi,t + β(r(θi,λi,t) − (λi,t − λ0
i,t)p) + η.
Regarding the land allocation in t + 1 note that landholders either buy
land on the market or inherit it. If ℓ > s land supply exceeds demand
by skilled agents and the market allocation assigns land at price pL to all
skilled agents and uniformly rations the excess supply to the unskilled. An
unskilled agent’s probability to obtain land on the market qL












1 if θi,t = H {
1 with prob. qL
0 with prob. 1 − qL if θi,t = L.
Hence, land is distributed randomly among the unskilled.
A similar reasoning applies when ℓ < s and thus pt = pH. All unskilled
agents sell their land on the market, while the skilled are indiﬀerent. At
16price pH there is excess demand and land is rationed uniformly to the skilled.












0 if θi,t=L {
1 with prob. qH
0 with prob. 1 − qH if θi,t=H.
This means that land is distributed randomly among the skilled.
4.2 Long Run Behavior
The transition functions derived above determine the dynamic pattern of
allocations in the model economy. We shall be especially concerned with the
question of whether markets are sustainable over time, or whether income
inequality generated by a market outcome today will preclude stability of
future markets. In the long run two distinct regimes can emerge. The ﬁrst is
sustainable markets, when spot markets for land are stable in every period.
The second is a limit cycle, when stable markets alternate with unstable
markets in regular intervals. To derive this we need to examine the inter-
temporal relation of equilibrium allocations, exploiting independence of both
skill draws and uniform rationing.
Note ﬁrst that a jungle in period t is followed by a market in t+1. This
is because in a jungle the elite obtains land for free and thus higher income
than weak agents. This preserves the power ranking and the oﬀspring of
period t’s elite forms the elite in t + 1, implying perfect correlation of land
and power. Proposition 3 then ensures that a market is stable, as the elite
already holds land and a positive measure of agents gain from trade.
But also a competitive market outcome in period t induces concentration
of land among the elite in t+1. This is because the event of being assigned
land yields a weakly higher income than not being assigned land. Hence,
agents who obtain land in a market have weakly higher income and enter
the elite in t + 1 at a rate bounded below by ℓ. A lemma summarizes these
ﬁndings, see appendix for the full proof.
Lemma 1 (Land Concentration) In any period t+1 the share of agents
endowed with land among the weak is less than ℓ, that is, Ft+1(ˆ ωt+1|λ =
0) > 1−ℓ. A jungle allocation in period t implies Ft+1(ˆ ωt+1|λ = 0) = 1 and
stability of markets in period t + 1.
17Although higher concentration of land favors stable markets (by Propo-
sition 3) in the current period, it increases future power inequality as a
market assigns rents to land sellers, which lets agents endowed with land
accumulate power even if unskilled. Indeed, to have a stable market in a
period t + 1 following a stable market in t period t + 1 power endowments,
induced by the market outcome in t, need to be suﬃciently equal, as stated
in the following proposition, see appendix for the proof.
Proposition 4 Suppose a market is an equilibrium allocation in period t.
A market is stable in period t + 1 if
αEt(ω) − βϕ1(s,ℓ,r(.),p) ≤ ϕ2(s,ℓ)αEt(ω|ω < ˆ ωt) + ηϕ3(s,ℓ),
where ϕ1, ϕ2, and ϕ3 are diﬀerentiable functions with ϕ2(s,ℓ) > 1 and
ϕ3(s,ℓ) > 0 that increase (decrease) in ℓ and decrease (increase) in s, ϕ1
decreases in the market price p = pθ and increases in r(θ,1) − r(θ,0) with
θ = H (θ = L) if s > ℓ (s < ℓ).
This immediately implies that stable markets spawn stable markets if
power is distributed suﬃciently equally in t, or if α is suﬃciently small while
η is suﬃciently large. When income aﬀects next period’s power (β > 0),
stability in t+1 is favored by lower market price p and higher returns from
land r(θ,1) − r(θ,0).
This is because a market has a twofold eﬀect: on the one hand power is
redistributed through randomly drawn rents from skill, on the other hand
power is accumulated by agents endowed with land through revenues from
sale. Note that, while under our assumptions pθ = r(θ,1) − r(θ,0), concave
utility or costly eﬀort investment may imply that pθ < r(θ,1) − r(θ,0).
If the diﬀerence r(θ,1) − r(θ,0) − pθ is suﬃciently high, then ϕ1(.) > 0
as a corollary to Proposition 4. This relaxes the condition in Proposition
4 favoring stability of a market outcome, and implies that redistributive
eﬀects of land transactions dominate and social mobility increases in β.
If land holdings are concentrated among the elite as stated in Lemma 1,
high rents for sellers undermine the market’s ability to redistribute power
through the skill premium. Indeed a market is followed by a jungle if power
is distributed suﬃciently unequally, as stated in the following proposition,
see appendix for details.
Proposition 5 Suppose a market is an equilibrium allocation in period t.
The jungle is the only stable outcome in period t + 1 if
αEt(ω) − βψ1(s,ℓ,r(.),p) ≥ ψ2(s,ℓ)αEt(ω|ω < ˆ ωt) + ηψ3(s,ℓ),
18where ψ1, ψ2, and ψ3 are positive functions that increase in ℓ and decrease
(increase) in s if s > ℓ (s < ℓ). ψ1 increases in r(θ,1) and decreases in p.
That is, suﬃcient inequality of power in t implies that a jungle is stable
in t + 1, when β and η are small enough. Stability of markets in the long
run then depends on whether markets induce suﬃciently equal power dis-
tributions over time. The next proposition gives conditions that ascertain
which regime will prevail, the proof can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 6 (Long Run Behavior) (i) Suppose the condition in Propo-
sition 4 holds in a period t0. Markets are stable in every period t > t0 if
κ1(s,ℓ,r(.),p)β + κ2(s,ℓ,r(.),p)αβ + κ3(s,ℓ)η ≤ 0,
where κ1, κ2, and κ3(.) < 0 are diﬀerentiable functions. If s < ℓ (s > ℓ),
κ2(.) > 0, κ1, κ2, κ3 increase (decrease) in ℓ, κ1 and κ3 decrease (increase)
in s.
(ii) Suppose the condition in Proposition 5 holds and markets are stable in
a period t0. Then the jungle is stable in every period t0 + 2τ − 1, and a
market is stable in every period t0 + 2τ for τ = 1,2,... if α is suﬃciently
great and β > 0, or if s is suﬃciently close to 1 when s > ℓ (s and r(L,0)
are suﬃciently close to 0 when s < ℓ).
Proposition 6 contains three important statements. First, as in the static
version, sustainable markets become more likely as the initial power distri-
bution becomes more equal and ℓ or s adjust to reduce mismatch of demand
and supply of land. Second, an ergodicity result holds: Propositions 4 and
6 imply that markets will be eventually stable forever, independently of the
initial power distribution, when social mobility in a society is high, that is
α suﬃciently small and η suﬃciently high. Then the power distribution is
compressed over time and eventually markets become sustainable.
Finally, part (ii) of Proposition 6 and Proposition 5 imply that suﬃcient
power inequality in some period may indeed lead to limit cycles, in particular
when persistence of power is high, but also when mismatch between demand
and supply is suﬃciently severe, e.g. when s is suﬃciently close to 1 if s > ℓ.
Both impede the market’s ability to redistribute power over time by way of
rent sharing through prices.
Whether markets are sustainable has important implications for eco-
nomic mobility as a market allocates resources by productivity, whereas a
jungle allocation is based on historic outcomes. Hence, our next concern
19is intergenerational earnings mobility. When markets are sustainable, inde-
pendent draws of skill ensure full social mobility in earnings and rents are
distributed equally in the long run. This need not be the case when the
economy alternates between markets and jungles. Elites are persistent, that
is oﬀspring of agents in the power elite will also be in the elite, if landowners
obtain a suﬃciently high share of the rents in the market outcome. Other-
wise identities of agents in the elite change over time in a limit cycle.
Proposition 7 Elites are persistent, i.e. for all i,j ∈ I ωi,t > ˆ ωt > ωj,t
implies ωi,t+2 > ˆ ωt+2 > ωj,t+2, if markets and jungles alternate for all t and
(i) ℓ<s, or (ii) if r(H,1)−r(H,0)−(r(L,1)−r(L,0))≤(1+α)(r(L,1)−r(H,0))
and ℓ>s.
Proof: Let t denote a period when markets are unstable. Choose i,j ∈ I so
that ωi,t > ˆ ωt > ωj,t. A jungle in t implies ωi,t+1 ≥ αωi,t + βr(L,1) + η and
ωj,t+1 ≤ αωi,t + βr(H,0). In period t + 1 markets must be stable and
ωi,t+2 ≥ αωi,t+1 + η + β
{
r(L,0) + pL if s < ℓ
r(H,0) + pH if s > ℓ
and
ωj,t+2 ≤ αωi,t+1 + η + β
{
r(H,1) − pL if s < ℓ
r(H,1) − pH if s > ℓ.
Clearly, ωi,t+2 > ˆ ωt+2 > ωj,t+2 if ωi,t+2 > ωj,t+2 for all i,j ∈ I with ωi,t >
ˆ ωt > ωj,t. Using the expressions from above, ωi,t+2 > ωj,t+2 if
α2ωi,t+β[αr(L,1)+r(L,0)+pL] > α2ωj,t+β[αr(H,0)+r(H,1)−pL] if s<ℓ,
α2ωi,t+β[αr(L,1)+r(L,0)+pH] > α2ωj,t+β[αr(L,0)+r(H,1)−pH] if s>ℓ.
This and the assumption r(L,1) ≥ r(H,0) establish the statement. 
A limit cycle of markets and jungles induces output ﬂuctuations. Aggre-




sr(H,1) + (ℓ − s)r(L,1) + (1 − ℓ)r(L,0) if s < ℓ
ℓr(H,1) + (s − ℓ)r(s,0) + (1 − s)r(L,0) if s > ℓ.
When a jungle is a stable outcome in period t, output is independent of
whether land is scarce or not:
yJ
t = s[ℓr(H,1) + (1 − ℓ)r(H,0)] + (1 − s)[ℓr(L,1) + (1 − ℓ)r(L,0)].
Clearly, yM
t > yJ
t . Therefore Propositions 4, 5, and 6 link inequality in
endowments and income to output eﬃciency and ﬂuctuations through the
land assignment mechanism. When volatility of output in periods t = t0 +
1,t0 + 2,... is measured by var(yt − yt−1) the following corollary emerges.
20Corollary 1 (Output Fluctuations) Lower output volatility and higher
average output in periods t0 + 1,t0 + 2,... is favored by
(i) less inequality of power in period t0,
(ii) less mismatch of demand and supply, that is lower (higher) s and higher
(lower) ℓ if s > ℓ (ℓ < s),
(iii) higher social mobility, i.e. lower α and higher η.
That is, higher initial inequality in power, a wider gap between land
demand and supply, and higher persistence of power diﬀerentials all tend to
accompany more volatile and – on average – lower output. This and higher
income inequality in the jungle are consistent with evidence on a negative
cross-country relationship between income inequality and macroeconomic
stability as measured by the duration of periods with positive growth rates
(Berg et al., 2008) and the standard deviation of the output growth rate
(Breen and Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa, 2005). Several examples follow to illustrate
the statements in Corollary 1.
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2006) put forward the idea that geographical
diﬀerences of European colonies aﬀected their institutional development
through technology even when colonial heritage is shared. The arrival of
European colonists altered the composition of the colony populations and
thus aﬀected inequality in the distributions of wealth, human capital, and
political power. Inequality in colonies was linked to both soil and climate
conditions and to the native and settler population density. British colonies
in the Caribbean were suitable for plantations, already populated and home
to diseases dangerous to European settlers. This translated into larger plot
size, smaller ratio of landholders and European in the population than in
temperate colonies, for instance in the northern parts of America. As owners
of land, mainly Europeans, were privileged both in terms of social status and
their ability to shape political decisions this led to greater initial inequal-
ity of land and power in plantation than in temperate farming colonies.18
Moreover, larger eﬃcient plot size in plantation economies can be viewed
in terms of greater mismatch of demand and supply in the land market.19
The reversal of fortunes of the Caribbean and North America appears thus
consistent with our theory as initial conditions in the northern economies
18Colonies that were scarcely populated when Europeans ﬁrst arrived, such as Australia,
New Zealand, Canada, or the United States, were characterized by relative equality in
wealth, human capital and political inﬂuence.
19Larger optimal plot sizes imply a smaller fraction of landowners, i.e. smaller ℓ in plan-
tation economies compared to farming economies. This corresponds to greater mismatch
of demand and supply in the land market, measured by the diﬀerence between s and ℓ.
21appear conducive to stable markets in the long run, though not necessarily
in the short run, while the opposite holds for the Caribbean colonies.20
Colonial legacy, mechanisms of land assignment and the power distribu-
tion seem to be important in India as well. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) ﬁnd
that property rights implicitly established by land revenue institutions set
up by the British have a signiﬁcant impact on later agricultural investment
and productivity. Districts in India where landlords had the right to collect
revenues from cultivators (thus holding de facto property rights) systemat-
ically under-perform districts where revenue collection was in the hands of
cultivators. They argue that the choice of the land revenue institutions by
the British was highly correlated with the economic and political power hold
by the local elites. Choice of the revenue system was aﬀected by pre-existing
degrees of power of the landlord class, particularly in Bengal, and to some
extent by exogenous reasons such as the ideology of the local British ad-
ministrators. Moreover, the land assignment institution established by the
British had a permanent eﬀect on the distribution of economic and political
power within Indian districts.
A possible negative association between inequality of political power and
economic outcomes is also supported by the micro evidence provided by
Acemoglu et al. (2008a). Data on political oﬃce holding in the state of
Cundinamarca, Colombia, suggest that concentration of power in the hands
of a small group of individuals is detrimental for economic development,
while economic inequality had little eﬀect.
Revisiting the Lucas and Benabou Sample
When power is interpreted as wealth, initial wealth inequality is linked
to long run macroeconomic performance in line with the observations on
South Korea and the Philippines put forward by B´ enabou (1996) and Lucas
(1993). Adding Malaysia to the sample illustrates how a jungle outcome
may be reached though ﬂawed market institutions. All three economies
emerged from Japanese occupation at the end of World War II, which can
be interpreted as a substantial institutional shock, and shared similar socio-
economic conditions in the 1950s and a similar development of political in-
stitutions with autocratic regimes in power for decades. Long run economic
outcomes in the three countries diﬀer considerably, however: South Korea
20Following this line of investigation Henry and Miller (2008) remark that despite shar-
ing colonial heritage and geographic conditions, after independence Barbados experienced
more sustained and less volatile growth than Jamaica. Barbados had a more equal initial
distribution of resources, however (data from Deininger and Squire, 1996).
22experience more stable and on average higher growth rates than Malaysia,
which in turn substantially outgrew the Philippines. This is despite the fact
that the Philippines had a superior starting point in the early postwar years.
The three countries also diﬀered considerably in initial wealth inequal-
ity, with South Korea having a remarkably equal distribution. This was the
result of land reforms in 1948 and 1950, as a result of U.S. pressure. These
land reforms and the Korean war (1950-53) eroded and leveled the social
hierarchy considerably (see the survey by Dorner and Thiesenhusen, 1990,
and the references therein). This is consistent with initial wealth inequal-
ity at independence interpretable as initial inequality of power. In light of
our theory this favors sustainability of institutions associated to competitive
market outcomes; indeed many of the export stimulating policies took the
form of tournaments and turned out to appropriately incentivize the pro-
ductive organization of the manufacturing sector. It is possible, of course,
that the associated income inequality is beginning to aﬀect the distribution
of power ultimately eroding market preserving institutions in the future.
Both Malaysia and the Philippines lacked such large scale reforms. In
Malaysia, a type of land reform occurred under British administration be-
tween 1948 and 1951, granting land rights to approximately 500.000 Chinese
citizens with the aim of placating potential supporters of a communist in-
surgency (see Hack, 1999, for a discussion of the historical literature on
the Malayan emergency). British attempts to grant race equality to Chi-
nese and Indian minorities faced ethnic Malayan opposition and were given
up by 1948, appeasing most of the ethnic Malay population. Though the
constitution in place after the end of the emergency 1957 granted equal cit-
izenship to Chinese and Indian minorities, colonial political structures were
retained, entrenching an ethnic Malayan elite in political power and pre-
serving ethnic Malay privileges. Economic power shifted to the Chinese,
however, who were more willing to take emerging business opportunities
than ethnic Malays, see e.g. Jomo and Gomez (2000) for details. In 1969
race riots led to a state of emergency, expropriation of Chinese businesses,
and constitutional changes that limited non-Malay ownership of companies
and access to university education, creating a barrier to holding physical
and human capital for the Chinese minority (see e.g. Jomo, 1990). That
is, Malaysia implemented a system of factor expropriation encoded in law,
reducing the need for wasteful rent-seeking activities.
In the Philippines social structure remained largely intact both through
Japanese and U.S. occupation and a U.S. proposal for land reform was
23blocked.21 Political reform extended the size of the electorate rapidly in
the 1950ies. This was accompanied by the emergence of a clientele system,
in which large landholders controlled the votes and, to some extent, coer-
cive power of their economically or socially dependents (Land´ e, 1965, Sidel,
1999), concentrating political power. This elite dominance provided ”a con-
venient system by which the power can be rotated at the top without eﬀec-
tive participation of those below.” (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003) In 1972
the Marcos regime began, whose activities have coined the term ”crony cap-
italism”. Hutchcroft (2000) concludes that economic development has been
hampered by obstructive corruption through extensive wasteful rent-seeking
activities and coercion.22
Meiji Restoration in Japan
Concerning the link between persistence of power diﬀerentials and sustain-
ability of markets, Temple and Johnson (1998) report that higher social
mobility in an economy is associated to higher subsequent growth. In a
similar vein Inglehart and Baker (2000) ﬁnd that economic development
is associated to more rational, tolerant, trusting, and participatory cultural
values. For a more elaborate case consider Japan’s transition from feudalism
under the Tokugawa shogunate to an industrial economy in the second half
19th century. This transition is commonly referred to as the Meiji Restora-
tion and credited with substantial institutional change toward a capitalist
society aiming to compete economically and militarily with the Western
powers.23 Of course, not all important social, economic and institutional
change can be attributed to a single event; there had been reforms before
the Meiji Restoration, in particular in the Tempo period (1830-44), but these
fell short of the substantial transformation that occurred after 1868.
In the middle of the 19th century exogenous events in form of mounting
21The Philippines did have a land reform, although only in 1972. Redistribution was
implemented chieﬂy where the breakup of large holdings could generate gains from trade
through innovations in e.g. crop choice by cultivators. Moreover, landowners’ compensa-
tions were close to market rates (at about three times the annual revenue), so that the
land reform did not substantially aﬀect inequality and, more importantly, it did not alter
social hierarchy, see Otsuka (1991) for a detailed account. In the 1960ies this evolved into
an oligarchy of powerful families owning large conglomerates.
22”The particular conﬁguration of political power in t/he Philippines, I will conclude,
has quite consistently nurtured a ”politics of privilege” generally obstructive to sustained
economic development.”, page 209
23See e.g. Beasley (2000), Jansen (1995) for thorough explorations of the Meiji period
in Japanese history.
24Western pressure on Japan to open up to trade (e.g. the bombardment of Edo
in 1853) exposed the allocative cost of isolation and a feudal system where
agricultural rents were appropriated by samurai (warriors who had become
a hereditary bureaucratic elite) and daimyo (feudal lords). The Tempo crisis
in 1833-38 (a great famine followed by a number of suppressed revolts) had
already led to a widespread belief that the political and economic organiza-
tion was inadequate and, when Western navies engaged, Japan’s technolog-
ical and military backwardness became very visible. This, and the sudden
availability of Western military technology to all factions able to pay for
it, weakened the shogunate’s position considerable. After years of political
turmoil, loss in military conﬂict (the second choshu expedition) eﬀectively
ended the Tokugawa shogunate in 1867. The resulting power vacuum was
ﬁlled by restoring the imperial authority in 1868 (the formal Meiji restora-
tion), primarily reﬂecting a loss of power of feudal lords and high-ranking
samurai. Dramatic institutional change ensued: in 1871 feudal privileges
were abolished (samurai lost their stipends and daimyo much of their land
holdings), as was the division of the Japanese society into classes of social
status linked to occupational choice.24 However, as e.g. Norman (1940) em-
phasizes, the restoration was by no means a people’s revolution, but rather a
shift in power from the nobility to low-ranking samurai, smaller landholders,
and merchants; in fact, the bureaucracy in the Meiji period relied substan-
tially on former samurai. In 1872 compulsory education was introduced
(before access to education was mainly limited to samurai), land expropria-
tion by landlords was prohibited, and the sale of private land holdings was
legalized. Land titles were issued, with an aim to create an administrative
base for raising land taxes. This further eroded the position of the old feu-
dal elite and was met with opposition (most ﬁercely during the Satsuma
revolution in 1877), but supporters of the new regime prevailed. The Meiji
constitution was put in place in 1889, granting the rule of law, independent
judiciary, property rights, freedom of occupational choice, and moderate
provisions for free speech. As for social change Howland (2001) notes that
in Tokugawa Japan “most positions of leadership and responsibility were, in
fact, ﬁlled on a hereditary basis and justiﬁed in terms of loyalty”. Bendix
(1966) puts forward the idea that by contrast in the Meiji period the samu-
rai warrior code, traditionally emphasizing concepts such as loyalty, evolved
to place more weight on competitiveness and achievements.
24The hereditary status classes were, from highest to lowest, samurai, peasants, artisans,
and merchants. See e.g. the review article by Howland (2001) for details on social class
and status in Tokugawa Japan.
25In light of our model abolishing feudal status classes and introducing
universal access to education and positions in the bureaucracy can be seen
as an increase in social mobility, facilitating the sustainability of market
supported institutions introduced at the same time. Indeed the beginning
of Japan’s emergence as an industrial economy and its modern growth is
commonly placed in the Meiji period (see among others Maddison, 2006).
5 Discussion and Extensions
5.1 Discussion
Technology
The production technology requires exactly one unit of land to be held in
order to use land productively. In essence, this is implied by the revenue
from land attaining a maximum at a ﬁnite plot size, that is a capacity con-
straint. This guarantees that in a jungle not all land is held by a measure
zero of agents. The assumption that the ﬁnite bounds on proﬁtable land
holdings are constant across agents primarily serves the ease of exposition.
It can be dropped, albeit at the expense of considerable notational inconve-
nience. Constant plot sizes imply that the measure of landholders equates
the measure of land endowment ℓ in all allocations. This seemingly excludes
coalitions in which land is distributed in smaller plot sizes. Note that such
coalitions are always dominated by a coalitional expropriation that gives
land to measure ℓ of the most powerful agents in the original coalition.
The production function itself requires that the returns from holding land
are positive and strictly increase in skill, and that the return from skill is
strictly positive for when holding land. More speciﬁc frameworks can be
accommodated, in particular those that induce a wedge between utility and
output gain from land or productivity. Examples include concave utility
functions or eﬀort investment at a convex utility cost, which may also be
interpreted as investment in education.
Law of Motion
A stochastic version of the law of motion (5) can be incorporated, assuming
for instance that the mobility component η is independently and identically
distributed across agents. Then properties of its distribution, such as ratios
of mean (mean of the median quantile) to upper and lower bounds of the
supports (to the means of top and bottom quantiles) aﬀect the suﬃcient
and necessary conditions for sustainable markets. Theses properties will
26aﬀect the dynamics via the degree of social mobility and power inequality.
The law of motion also assumes absence of interaction between the diﬀerent
factors determining the transition of power, persistence of power, sensitivity
of power to income, and the mobility component. Such complementarities
may arise in certain speciﬁc applications of the model; their study is left for
future research.
Uniqueness
Since the set of stable outcomes may not be a singleton, it is of interest which
circumstances imply that markets are not only a stable outcome but also the
only one. This occurs if the market allocation dominates all other admissible
allocations. This in turn is true if and only if – given parameters – markets
dominate the optimal coalitional expropriation to attack markets. Such an
optimal coalitional expropriation exists and is well-deﬁned: an admissible
distribution of land λ′ that maximizes the diﬀerence between the power of
agents strictly preferring (λ′,0) and the power of those strictly preferring a
market allocation. Then, if markets dominate (λ′,0), markets also dominate
any other coalitional expropriation.
Intuitively, the optimal coalition to attack markets assigns land to the
agents with the highest marginal contribution to that coalition’s power
against market supporters. Hence, agents who switch strict preference for
markets to coalitional expropriation when assigned land carry double the
weight of agents who switch to or from indiﬀerence only. Agents whose
preferences do not depend on whether they obtain land are never assigned
land, see appendix for an example. Proposition 3 can be generalized to
state that a market allocation is the unique stable outcome if the mismatch
between demand and supply is low and the correlation of land and power
is suﬃciently strong. Although a more elaborate redistribution is needed,
part (ii) of Proposition 3 generalizes in case ℓ > s, for ℓ < s an additional
qualiﬁer has to require that s is suﬃciently high.25
Set of Admissible Allocations
A discussion of other conceptual frameworks to model factor allocation and
expropriation is in order. For instance, an outcome where some agents
expropriate others, while the remaining land is traded on the market could
be reached by randomly matching buyers and sellers (the jungle outcome
25See Appendix for a formal analysis deriving the optimal coalitional expropriation to
attack markets and conditions for the market allocation as the unique stable outcome.
27corresponds to a framework where matching is directed in terms of power).
Such a framework remains silent on institutions that determine economic
outcomes, and one would need to deﬁne institutions ad hoc, for instance
by postulating a punishment probability. But probability and extent of
the punishment should be chosen by someone, and enforcers need to be
properly incentivized. Absent such construct, a competitive market outcome
is secured in such a frame if and only if land is distributed to the most
powerful, which essentially means that property rights are interpreted as an
equilibrium where all agents refrain from expropriating (as in Hafer, 2006).
Considering market allocations with non-Walrasian prices mainly adds
the possibility for sellers to extract market rents from buyers. This would
have no eﬀect when ℓ < s as sellers obtain the entire rent anyway. If ℓ > s
this facilitates the emergence of limit cycles, since less powerful buyers do
not receive rents, which makes elites persistent, see Proposition 7.
5.2 Endogenous Growth
In our framework aggregate inputs of production, land and skill, remain
constant over time, which rules out persistent growth of the economy. This
subsection discusses possible approaches to endogenize skill levels and enrich
the dynamics of the model enabling endogenous growth.
A ﬁrst approach is introducing individual human capital investment at a
cost related to ability θ. Suppose after land is assigned agents can invest ei
in human capital, or education, at cost e2
i/(2θi) and agents’ income is
√
Wei
if using land, and
√
wei otherwise, with W > w > 0 denoting labor produc-
tivity. Suppose also that there are aggregate spill-overs in human capital
investment that increase labor productivity. Speciﬁcally let productivity
depend on past aggregate human capital investment et−1 =
∫
i∈I ei,t−1di:
Wt = ρ(et−1)Wt−1 and wt = ρ(et−1)wt−1,
where ρ is an increasing function. It can be veriﬁed that a limit cycle induces
lower and more volatile long run growth rates than persistent markets.26
Another issue arises when spill-overs from human capital investments do
not aﬀect productivity, but the probability of being skilled s. Suppose for
instance that the probability of θi = H is a time variant function depending
on aggregate investment in the last period:
st = ν(et−1,st−1).
26Parente and Prescott (1999) illustrate how such market distortions, in their case factor
monopolies, generate sizable losses in long run growth compared to a free market economy.
28Suppose ν(.) is bounded above by 1. Since aggregate output depends on st
the results above carry over: jungles generate less investment and income
than markets, aggregate income increases in the measure of skilled agents,
and a limit cycle is associated with a lower growth path than sustainable
markets.27 This setting allows also for institutional poverty traps, as a limit
cycle may prevent enough human capital accumulation for st suﬃciently
high to guarantee a sustainable markets regime.
Finally, individual investments may aﬀect children’s probability to be-
come skilled, that is skills are no longer distributed independently. When
individual probability to become skilled depends on parents’ income, and
possibly power, eﬀects are ambiguous: positive autocorrelation of skill makes
both accumulation and redistribution of power by markets more eﬀective as
being skilled also raises expected income of one’s oﬀspring independently
of land ownership. Furthermore, autocorrelation of skill reduces the num-
ber of agents who gain from trade, to the detriment of market stability. A
thorough treatment of this case is left to future research.
5.3 Implications
Our theory oﬀers some insights that can possibly be exploited in new em-
pirical work. On an abstract level it implies that both (i) initial power
inequality and (ii) intergenerational transition of power inducing high per-
sistence of the power ranking, possibly via an unequal distribution of market
rents, are linked to less stable market institutions and inferior long run eco-
nomic outcomes. To be more speciﬁc the abstract concept of power has to
be suitably interpreted.
As argued above power may be interpreted as wealth. Then our model
links initial wealth inequality to macroeconomic volatility through an in-
stitutional channel and predicts that endowment inequality favors output
ﬂuctuations and instability of institutions associated to competitive market
outcomes. Other explanations linking wealth inequality and macroeconomic
volatility rest for instance on imperfect access to capital markets (Aghion
et al., 1999) and preference heterogeneity (Ghiglino and Venditti, 2007).
Evidence on the relation of institutions and macroeconomic ﬂuctuations is
reported e.g. in Acemoglu et al. (2003) emphasizing the role of institutions
in the choice of ﬁscal and monetary policies.28 Perhaps most closely related,
27Note also the possibility that a land abundant economy (ℓ > st) may become skill
abundant (st > ℓ), which may trigger a regime switch of the long run behavior.
28Rodrik (2002) shows that countries with democratic institutions experience less
volatility than nondemocratic regimes, though Mulligan et al. (2004) conclude that democ-
29Rodrik (1999) argues that economies with more divisive societies and weak
institutions of conﬂict resolution are prone to social conﬂict and therefore
less able to mitigate adverse shocks.
The intergenerational transmission of power and the degree of rank
preservation of dynasties in the power distribution, corresponding to per-
sistence and mobility parameters α and η, corresponds best to measures of
social mobility. Social mobility is partly determined by the ability of insti-
tutions to uphold a market outcome, endogenous in our model, but also by
social norms and cultural values that remain constant over time. A text-
book example for low social mobility in this sense is India’s caste system.
Regardless of the interpretation of power, social norms inducing redistri-
bution of power through market outcomes favor long run sustainability of
markets. Hence, our model implies that values and norms that support
social mobility are associated to superior long run development.
Interpreting power as social status a direct implication emerges for sys-
tem of cultural values and social norms: societies that employ value systems
that assign social status on a meritocratic basis, i.e. individual social sta-
tus does not depend on parental status, correspond in light of model to
economies with low power inequality, which facilitates the stability of com-
petitive market outcomes both in the short and the long run.29 Possible
eﬀects of norms and values on certain economic outcomes have been doc-
umented: income per capita and growth rate (Tabellini, 2010), ﬁnancial
decisions (Guiso et al., 2004) and labor market outcomes (Br¨ ugger et al.,
2009). Our theory implies that societies that are more leveled in terms of
social status tend to sustain institutions associated to competitive market
outcomes and achieve better and less volatile long run outcomes.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented a tractable framework where economic outcomes are
required to be robust to coalitional deviations of agents. This serves to focus
attention on properties of economic outcomes necessary for adequate insti-
tutions that implement markets to emerge, without the need to explicitly
state the mix of institutions employed to this end. We ﬁnd that unstable
racies and non-democracies do not diﬀer in the choice of public policies.
29E.g. Di Tella et al. (2007) measure meritocratic and market beliefs using survey ques-
tions like “Do you believe that it is possible to be successful on your own or a large group
that supports each other is necessary?” or “In general, people who put eﬀort working end
up much better, better, worse, or much worse than those that do not put an eﬀort?”.
30markets may be persistent, in the form of limit cycles where markets and
jungles alternate. Identity of ruling elites may change over time. When the
transmission of power across generations generates suﬃcient social mobility,
markets become sustainable for any initial power distribution. Sustainabil-
ity of markets in economies is favored by less initial power inequality and
less mismatch between supply and demand on the land market.
The choice of modeling approach seems instructive as it generates a
rich set of outcomes. A subset of our results, such as persistent elites,
have already been generated in less abstract frameworks, indicating that our
approach to embed institutional quality connects well to existing literature.
While our framework willingly gives up complexity to achieve a modicum
of tractability, the results look encouraging, not least since they highlight a
number of issues that future research may successfully pursue.
As the transition of power may exert considerable inﬂuence on long
run institutional outcomes, further examination of the determinants of its
law of motion appears of interest. Some of these may be to a degree sub-
ject to choice, for instance legislation, income taxation or public spending.
When evaluating the relative merits of such institutions a substantial con-
cern should be whether they are dynamically self-enforcing.
Finally, further work may proﬁtably examine settings where agents’ be-
havior is forward-looking. This yields some potentially interesting strategic
considerations. For instance, desirability of expropriation today will depend
on the continuation valuation of land holdings, which in turn will depend on
whether markets will be stable tomorrow. Adding uncertainty will further
enrich the set of contracts usable in a market and may allow to determine
the necessary conditions for a full set of Arrow-Debreu markets to emerge
in the shadow of coalitional expropriation.
A Mathematical Appendix
Example: Emptiness of the core, non-existence of a stable set,
and the largest consistent set
In the following numerical example the binary relation ≻ is not transitive.
This in turn will lead to emptiness of the core and non-existence of a von
Neumann-Morgenstern stable set.
31Core and stable sets
Suppose that measure 1/2 of agents are weak having power ωi = 2/3, while
the remaining agents are strong with power ωi = 1. Let agents become
skilled with probability s = 1/3 independently of land holdings and power.
Suppose ℓ = 1/2, i.e. land is abundant. The distribution of land is as follows.
Measure ϵ ∈ (0,1/2) of weak agents hold land, and so do measure 1/2−ϵ of
strong agents.
A Walrasian allocation (W) assigns land to all the skilled and makes
unskilled agents indiﬀerent between holding and not holding land, as there
is more land than skilled agents. Compare now a Walrasian allocation to
an allocation that assigns all land to the most powerful, i.e. to the strong
agents, the jungle (J). Measure ϵ of strong agents strictly prefer J, while
measure ϵ + (1/2 − ϵ)/3 of weak agents strictly prefer W as they are not
expropriated or able to obtain a rent buying land in the market. Hence,













> ϵ ⇔ ϵ < 1/3.
Consider now an allocation that assigns land to all skilled strong agents,
and to measure 2ϵ/3 + γ of skilled weak agents, with γ ≥ 0, and to mea-
sure 2(1/2 − ϵ)/3 − γ of unskilled strong agents, but not to unskilled weak
agents. That is, unskilled weak and measure γ of unskilled strong landhold-
ers are expropriated. The land is given to the skilled, giving strong agents
priority. Call this allocation an expropriation X(γ). Clearly, J ≻ X(γ).






























That is, if ϵ + 3γ/5 > 1/5. Suppose for the following that ϵ = 1/5, and
therefore (6) holds with equality for γ = 0. Then
W ≻ J ≻ X(γ) ≻ W for γ ∈ (0,1/5].
None of these allocations are in the core of an appropriately deﬁned cooper-
ative game under nontransferable utility (where a core allocation has to be
stable with respect to coalitional deviations, such that deviators are strictly
better oﬀ and their power exceeds that of strict supporters of the core allo-
cation). Since J dominates all other non-Walrasian allocations as 1 > 2/3,
such a core must be empty.
Likewise a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set fails to exist. To see
this suppose that J is not in a stable set. Then the stable set consists only of
32Walrasian allocations, because J dominates non-Walrasian allocations. This
contradicts external stability as X(γ) ≻ W for γ > 0. Suppose therefore
that J is in a stable set. Internal stability then requires J to be the only
element in the stable set. But this contradicts external stability as W ≻ J.
Indirect dominance and the largest consistent set
Turn now to the indirect dominance relation as deﬁned by Chwe (1994):
An allocation a is indirectly dominated by allocation b if there
exist allocations a0,a1,a2,...,am (where a0 = a and am = b) and
coalitions S0,S1,S2,...,Sm−1, such that ai →Si ai+1 and ai ≺Si b
for i = 0,1,2,...,m − 1.
Here ai →Si ai+1 indicates that coalition Si can replace ai by ai+1. This
corresponds to the strict winners Si being a power majority when comparing
ai to ai+1, i.e. ai+1 ≻ ai.
Indirect dominance b   a via ai in the sense of Chwe (1994) requires a
power majority for both the move from a to ai and the move from ai to
b. At each move a power majority has to strictly prefer the ﬁnal allocation
b to the status quo. But this implies that b ≻ a, i.e. b directly dominates
a. Hence, indirect dominance implies direct dominance and an allocation b
only indirectly dominates an allocation a via ai if both b ≻ a and b ≻ ai.
If in contrast to Chwe (1994) indirect dominance of b over a via ai only
requires that ai ≻ a and b ⊀ ai, indirect dominance becomes meaningful
in our setup. In particular, there is an allocation a, such that W   a via
J but W ⊀ a. An example of such an allocation is X(0), as by (6) for
γ = 0 aggregate power of winners and losers from a move to W are equal
for ϵ = 1/5. As J ≻ X(0) indeed W  X(0) via J. Moreover, X(γ) ≻ X(γ′)
whenever γ < γ′, since land is redistributed from measure γ′ − γ of strong
to weak agents.
Indeed the set {W,J,X(0)} is consistent, since any allocation dominating
W, i.e. X(γ) ≺ X(0) ∈ Y (for γ > 0), any allocation dominating J, i.e.
W   X(0) ∈ Y via any X(γ) (with γ > 0), and any allocation dominating
X(0) is directly dominated by W ∈ Y , but X(0) ⊀ W. Moreover, for any
admissible Z / ∈ Y , Z ≺ J. But either Z   W, in which case J cannot
be deterred by W, or Z ≻ W (in which case J can be deterred). Yet as
Z ̸= X(0) and Z ≻ W implies Z ≺ X(0), in this last case there is X(γ),
γ > 0, with X(γ) ≻ Z and X(γ) ≻ W. X(γ) cannot be deterred by J or
X(0) as J ≻ Z and X(0) ≻ Z. As Y ⊂ ¯ Y , so are W, J, and X(0).
33Proof of Proposition 1
Consider admissible allocation (λ′,0). u(λ0
i,θi,λJ
i ,0) > u(λ0
i,θi,λ′
i,0) iﬀ
i ∈ C = {i ∈ I : λ′
i = 0 ∧ λJ
i = 1}, and u(λ0
i,θi,λJ
i ,0) < u(λ0,θi,λ′
i,0) iﬀ
i ∈ C′ = {i ∈ I : λ′
i=1 ∧ λJ







Denoting by µ the Lebesgue measure of agents, µ(i ∈ I : λ′
i=1 ∧ λJ
i =0) =
µ(i ∈ I : λ′
i = 0 ∧ λJ
i = 1) as both allocations are admissible. Therefore
µ(i ∈ C) = µ(i ∈ C′). Since λJ
i = 1 ⇔ ωi ≥ ˆ ω and λJ
i = 0 ⇔ ωi ≤ ˆ ω,
ωi ≥ ωj for all i ∈ C and j ∈ C′. This implies (7). Uniqueness a.e. follows
from the deﬁnition of ˆ ω and the assumption that F(ω) is atom-less.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds in four steps.
Step 1. Since all elements in W(λ0) are payoﬀ equivalent, it suﬃces to
consider a typical element (λM,p) ∈ W(λ0). As noted in the text three
regimes may emerge.
(a) Let (λJ,0) ≻ (λM,p). Then ¯ Y = (λJ,0).
(b) Let (λM,p) ≻ (λ,0) for all admissible (λ,0). Then ¯ Y = W(λ0).
(c) Let (λM,p) ≻ (λJ,0) and suppose there is an admissible (λ′,0) with
(λ′,0) ≻ (λM,p). By Proposition 1 (λJ,0) ≻ (λ′,0) and there is a
cycle. Denote by X = {(λ,0) : (λ,0) admissible,(λ,0) ≻ (λM,p)} the
set of expropriations that dominate the Walrasian allocation.
Step 2. Let case (c) hold. There is always an admissible allocation (λX,0) ⊀












i ,p)}. By the intermediate value theorem the assumption (λ′,0) ≻





j∈C′(λK) ωjdj = 0 for all (λK,0) ∈ K.
For any (λ′,0) ∈ X deﬁne the measure of landowners’ power by PL(λ) =
∫
i∈I:λi=1 ωidi. Note that PL(λ) > PL(λ′) implies (λ,0) ≻ (λ′,0). Deﬁne
an allocation (λX,0) = argmax(λ,0)∈K PL(λ). Since F(ω) is atom-less, a
revealed preference argument validates that PL(λX) > PL(λ′) for all (λ′,0) ∈
X since the constraint induced by (λ′,0) ≻ (λM,p) must be binding as
34(λM,p) ≻ (λJ,0) (implying that in all allocations in X some weak agents
are assigned land) holds.
Step 3. To show that Y = (λJ,0) ∪ W(λ0) ∪ (λX,0) is consistent note that
(a) for all allocations that dominate (λJ,0) (i.e. W(λ0)) the allocation
(λX,0) ⊂ Y (in)directly dominates (λM,p) via some (λ′,0) ∈ X, but
(λJ,0) ≻ (λ,0) for all admissible allocations (λ,0).
(b) For all allocations that dominate (λM,p), that is all (λ′,0) ∈ X, there
is (λJ,0) ∈ Y with (λJ,0)   (λ′,0), but (λM,p) ≻ (λJ,0).
(c) For all allocations that dominate (λX,0), that is all (λ′,0) ≻ (λX,0),
(λM,p) ≻ (λ′,0), as shown in Step 2 above. But (λX,0) ⊀ (λM,p).
(d) For all (λ′,0) / ∈ Y with (λM,p) ≻ (λ′,0), (λJ,0) ≻ (λ′,0). This
deviation cannot be deterred by a market outcome. For all (λ′,0) / ∈ Y
with (λM,p) ≺ (λ′,0) there is always an allocation (λ′′,0) such that
(λ′′,0) ≻ (λ′,0) and (λ′′,0) ≻ (λM,p). Although (λ′′,0) ≺ (λX,0) and
(λ′′,0) ≺ (λJ,0), (λ′′,0) cannot be deterred by either, since (λ′,0) ≺
(λX,0) and (λ′,0) ≺ (λJ,0). So (λ′,0) cannot be in the consistent set.
Step 4. Since Y is consistent, whenever W(λ0) ∈ Y , market allocations are
in also in the largest consistent set, that is W(λ0) ⊂ ¯ Y .
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) Evident from (3) and (4).
(ii) The proof constructs a power redistribution that decreases the diﬀerence
RHS - LHS of the relevant condition in (3), (4). Choose τ > 0 and denote the
power distribution after redistributing by ω′. Set ω′
i = (1 − τ)ωi if ωi ≥ ˆ ω,
and set ω′
j for j ∈ I : ωj < ˆ ω such that ω′











Since µ(j ∈ I : ωj < ˆ ω) > 0 by assumption, there is τ suﬃciently small to
satisfy (8). This decreases all agents’ power at rate τ and redistributes the
proceeds τ among the weakest, and preserves agents’ relative position with
respect to ˆ ω (a redistribution with ω′
i = (1−τ)ωi+T and T = τ
∫ ω
ω ωdF(ω)





35which is negative. The change of the LHS depends on p.
Let ﬁrst p = pL. Then the change in the LHS of (3) is positive, ∆LHS >
0, since θ is independent of ω and λ. Hence, ∆LHS − ∆RHS > 0.
In case p = pH the change of the LHS of (4) satisﬁes












so that ∆LHS − ∆RHS > 0.
(iii) As (I,B(I),µ), where B(I) denotes the Borel sigma algebra on I and
µ the Lebesgue measure, is a measure space, and P and L are measurable
functions mapping I into {0;1}, P and L are well-deﬁned, with distributions
GP(P = X) = µ(i ∈ I : P(i) = X) and GL(L = X) = µ(i ∈ I : λ0
i = X)
Let ϵ > 0 and set ρ = 1 − ϵ. By deﬁnition var(P) = var(L) = ℓ(1 − ℓ).
Thus E[PL] = (1 − ϵ)ℓ(1 − ℓ) + ℓ2 = ℓ(1 − ϵ(1 − ℓ)). Then P ∈ {0;1} and
L ∈ {0;1} implies Prob(P =L= 1) = ℓ(1 − ϵ(1 − ℓ)). Deﬁne δ := ℓ(1 − ℓ)ϵ.
Now measure δ > 0 of agents have P = 1 and L = 0, and oppose markets.





Likewise, measure δ of agents (with P = 0 and L = 1) prefer markets. If






ωdG(ω,0) ≥ δω + s(1 − ℓ − δ)ω.
Thus a suﬃcient condition for (3), implying the statement for p = pL, is
δ <
s(1 − ℓ)
ω − (1 − s)ω
.
Let now p = pH. Then unskilled agents with P = 1 and L = 1 prefer






ωdG(ω,1) ≥ δω + (1 − s)(ℓ − δ) ˆ ω.
A suﬃcient condition for (4), implying the statement for p = pH, is then
δ <
(1 − s)ℓ
ω + (1 − s)ˆ ω − ω
.
36Proof of Lemma 1
As mentioned in the text, a jungle in t implies Gt+1(ˆ ωt+1,0) = 1 − ℓ, as
r(L,1) ≥ r(H,0), which ensures that in t agents in the elite have higher
income than all other agents, placing their oﬀspring among the elite in t+1.
Suppose instead markets are stable in t. In case of a jungle in t − 1,
Gt(ˆ ωt,0) = 1 − ℓ and uniform rationing implies that Gt+1(ˆ ωt+1,0) ≥ (1 −
ℓ)2 = (1 − ℓ)(1 − s)(1 − qL) if ℓ > s and Gt+1(ˆ ωt+1,0) ≥ (1 − ℓ)2 = (1 −
ℓ)(1−s+s(1−qH)) if ℓ < s. Suppose instead markets were stable in t−1.
Let ℓ > s ﬁrst. By the deﬁnition of ˆ ω and the transition function ra-












































Since Ft+1(ˆ ω) = 1−ℓ, and agents who obtain land in t have highest income
in the set of agents with same initial land holdings in t, it must hold that





























as all the agents summed up on the RHS do not bequeath land with proba-
bility (1−ℓ) and have income r(L,0) or r(L,0)+pL ensuring that they end
up with ωt+1 ≤ ˆ ωt+1. Therefore
Gt+1(ˆ ωt+1,0) > (1−ℓ)2,
independent of stability of markets in t. Since Ft+1(ˆ ωt+1) = 1 − ℓ and the
measure of agents without land is 1−ℓ, this implies Gt+1(ˆ ωt+1,1) ≤ (1−ℓ)ℓ.
Let s > ℓ. Because of uniform rationing of land with probability qH =













































37Using an argument analogous to the one above, exploiting that agents who
obtain land in t have higher income in t than those who did not among
agents with the same initial land endowments in t, yields













Since the mass on the RHS characterizes all agents who would end up with
land in t+1 and have ωi,t+1 < ˆ ωt+1, and land is allocated randomly and in-
dependently with probability ℓ = sqH, the proportion of landholders among
the weak in t + 1 is bounded above by ℓ:
ℓ(1 − ℓ) > Gt+1(ˆ ωt+1,1),
or, equivalently, Gt+1(ˆ ωt+1,0) < (1 − ℓ)2.
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Let ℓ > s, then p = pL, unskilled agents obtain land with probability qL,
and skilled agents with certainty. Using the market stability condition (3),
(λM,p) ≻ (λJ,0) holds in t + 1 if and only if




A market allocation in t rations land uniformly to the unskilled, so that




Turn now to the second term on the RHS of (9). By Lemma 1
Gt+1(ˆ ωt+1,0) ≥ (1−ℓ)2, (11)
independent of stability of markets in t. Using (10) and (11) on (9), a
suﬃcient condition for stable markets in t+1 given that markets were stable




+ η ≤Et+1(ω|ω<ˆ ωt+1)
+ s(1−ℓ)Et+1(ω|ω<ˆ ωt+1,λ=0).
Since land is allocated by independent draws via a market in t,
Et+1(ω|ω<ˆ ωt+1,λ=0) ≥ αEt(ω|ω<ˆ ωt) + βr(L,0) + η and
Et+1(ω|ω<ˆ ωt+1) ≥ αEt(ω|ω<ˆ ωt) + β[r(L,0) + ℓ(r(L,1)−r(L,0)−pL) + η,
38where the ﬁrst line uses that r(L,0) is a general lower bound on income. The
second inequality follows as aggregate power of the weak in t+1 weakly ex-
ceeds aggregate power of the weak in t plus the lower bound of the expected
income of an agent without land endowment in t who obtains land with
probability ℓ. Combining the above expressions yields
αEt(ω) − β[s(1 − ℓ)r(L,0) + ℓ(r(L,1) − r(L,0) − 2pL)]
≤ (1 + s(1 − ℓ))αEt(ω|ω<ˆ ωt) + s(1 − ℓ)η. (12)
(ii) Suppose now that ℓ < s, then p = pH and skilled agents obtain land with
probability qH, while the unskilled do not obtain land. Using the market
stability condition (4), (λM,p) ≻ (λJ,0) holds in t + 1 if and only if




By Lemma 1 the share of landholders among the weak in t + 1 is bounded
above by ℓ:
ℓ − Gt+1(ˆ ωt+1,1) > ℓ2. (14)
Hence, ∫ ωt+1
^ ωt+1
ωdGt+1(ω,1) > ℓ2Et+1(ω|ω > ˆ ωt+1,λ=1).
Using this on (13) a suﬃcient condition for stable markets in t + 1 is
Et+1(ω|λ=1) > Et+1(ω|ω>ˆ ωt+1) − (1 − s)ℓEt+1(ω|ω>ˆ ωt+1,λ=1). (15)
By independence of skill, and land and power, due to uniform rationing,
Et+1(ω|λ=1) = αEt(ω) + β
(
r(H,1) − (1 − ℓ)pH)
+ η. (16)
Turning to the RHS of (15), as landed agents have highest income
Et+1(ω|ω>ˆ ωt+1) <αEt(ω|ω>ˆ ωt) + η
+ β[ℓr(H,1)+(s−ℓ)r(H,0)+(1−s)r(L,0)+(1−ℓ)pH].
Moreover, the strong landed in t+1 must have had at least average expected
income of any agent who was landless in t:
Et+1(ω|ω>ˆ ωt+1,λ=1) >αEt(ω|ω>ˆ ωt) + η
+ β(ℓ(r(H,1)−pH)+(s−ℓ)r(H,0)+(1−s)r(L,0)).
39Using these inequalities on (15), markets are stable in t+1 if they are stable
in t and
αEt(ω) + β[(1−ℓ + (1−s)ℓ2)(r(H,1) − r(H,0)) − (2(1−ℓ) + (1−s)ℓ2)pH]
+ β(1−s)[(1 + sℓ)(r(H,0) − r(L,0)) + ℓr(L,0)]
≥ (1 − (1−s)ℓ)αEt(ω|ω>ˆ ωt) − (1−s)ℓη. (17)
Noting that ℓEt(ω|ω>ˆ ωt) + (1−ℓ)Et(ω|ω<ˆ ωt) = Et(ω), (17) becomes
αEt(ω) −
β[(1−ℓ + (1−s)ℓ2)(r(H,1)−r(H,0)) − (2(1−ℓ) + (1−s)ℓ2)pH]
1/ℓ − (2−s)
−
β(1−s)[(1+sℓ)(r(H,0) − r(L,0)) + ℓr(L,0)]
1/ℓ − (2−s)
≤
(1−ℓ)(1/ℓ − (1−s))αEt(ω|ω<ˆ ωt) + (1−s)ℓη
1/ℓ − (2−s)
.
Proof of Proposition 5
This proof proceeds similarly to the one of Proposition 4.
(i) Start with the case s < ℓ, then p = pL and the market assigns land to all
skilled agents, and to unskilled agents with probability qL. Since aggregate
power of all agents without land must weakly exceed aggregate power of
weak agents without land, an inclusion argument holds:
∫ ^ ωt+1
ωt+1
ωdGt+1(ω,0) ≤ (1 − ℓ)Et+1(ω|λ=0). (18)
Using (10) and (18) on (9), a suﬃcient condition for the jungle to be the
only stable outcome in period t + 1 is
Et+1(ω|ω<ˆ ωt+1) ≤ (1−s)αEt(ω)+β(1−s)(r(L,0)+ℓpL)+(1−s)η. (19)
By assumption markets were stable in period t, so that
Et+1(ω|ω<ˆ ωt+1) ≤αEt(ω|ω<ˆ ωt) + η
+β(sr(H,1) + (ℓ − s)r(L,1) + (1 − s)r(L,0)). (20)
This upper bound is obtained by calculating the expected income of the
weak in t. Note that by (11) at most fraction ℓ of agents with ωt < ˆ ωt have
land in t. Combining (19) and (20) yields a suﬃcient condition for a jungle














40(ii) Let now s > ℓ, then p = pH and the market assigns land only to skilled,






ωdFt+1(ω) = ℓEt+1(ω|ω>ˆ ωt+1).
Hence, to have a jungle as the only stable outcome in t + 1 it is suﬃcient
that
Et+1(ω|λ=1) < sEt+1(ω|ω>ˆ ωt+1). (22)
By assumption markets were stable in t, so that
Et+1(ω|ω>ˆ ωt+1) >αEt(ω|ω>ˆ ωt)
+ β (ℓr(H,1) + (s−ℓ)r(H,0) + (1−s)r(L,0)) + η.
This lower bound is obtained by calculating the expected income of the
strong in t. By (14) at least fraction ℓ of agents with ωt > ˆ ωt have land
in t. Hence, using (16) a suﬃcient condition for a jungle as the only stable
outcome in t + 1 (given that market was an equilibrium in t) is
αEt(ω) + β[(1−sℓ)(r(H,1) − r(H,0)) − (1−ℓ)pH
+(1−s2)r(H,0) − s(1−s)ry(L,0)] + (1 − s)η ≤ sαEt(ω|ω>ˆ ωt). (23)











Diﬀerentiation yields the comparative statics.
Proof of Proposition 6
To simplify notation of this proof we use the abbreviation ∆r(θ) := r(θ,1)−
r(θ,0). Assume that in a period t a market is stable.
Part 1. For the ﬁrst part suppose a market is stable also in t + 1, i.e. the
appropriate condition of (12) and (17) holds.
(i) Let again ﬁrst ℓ > s. Suppose condition (12) holds and markets are
indeed stable in period t. Then
Et+1(ω) = αEt(ω) + β(sr(H,1) + (ℓ−s)r(L,1) + (1−ℓ)r(L,0)) + η and
Et+1(ω|ω<ˆ ωt+1) ≥ αEt(ω|ω<ˆ ωt) + β((1−ℓ)r(L,0) + ℓ(r(L,1)−pL)) + η.
41The second line uses that the landless unskilled have lowest income in a
market. By (12)
(1 + s(1−ℓ))αEt(ω|ω<ˆ ωt) + s(1−ℓ)η
≥αEt(ω) − β[s(1−ℓ)r(L,0) + ℓ(∆r(L)−2pL)]. (24)
Applying (12) once more, markets in t + 2 are stable if
αEt+1(ω) − β[s(1−ℓ)r(L,0) + ℓ(∆r(L)−2pL)]
≤(1 + s(1−ℓ))αEt+1(ω|ω<ˆ ωt+1) + s(1−ℓ)η.
This, using (24) and the expressions above, is implied by
αβ
[
s(r(H,1) − r(L,1)) + ℓ(1 − s(1 − ℓ))(∆r(L) − pL)
]
≤β[s(1 − ℓ)r(L,0) + ℓ(∆r(L) − 2pL)] + s(1 − ℓ)η.
(ii) Consider now ℓ < s. Suppose condition (17) holds and markets are
indeed stable in t. Then
Et+1(ω) = αEt(ω) + β(ℓr(H,1) + (s − ℓ)r(H,0) + (1 − s)r(L,0)) + η and
Et+1(ω|ω>ˆ ωt+1) ≤ αEt(ω|ω>ˆ ωt)+η
+β(ℓr(H,1)+(s−ℓ)r(H,0)+(1−s)r(L,0)+(1−ℓ)pH).
The second line follows since landholders have highest incomes in markets.
Recall (17), which was given by
(1−(1−s)ℓ)αEt(ω|ω>ˆ ωt) − (1−s)ℓη
≤αEt(ω) + β[(1−ℓ+(1−s)ℓ2)∆r(H) − (2(1−ℓ) + (1 − s)ℓ2)pH]
+ β(1−s)[(1 + sℓ)(r(H,0) − y(L,0)) + ℓr(L,0)].
Invoking (17) again, a market is stable in t + 2 if
αEt+1(ω) + β[(1−ℓ+(1−s)ℓ2)∆r(H) − (2(1−ℓ) + (1−s)ℓ2)pH]
+ β(1 − s)[(1 + sℓ)(r(H,0) − r(L,0)) + ℓr(L,0)]
≥ (1 − (1 − s)ℓ)αEt+1(ω|ω>ˆ ωt+1) − (1 − s)ℓη.
This, using (17) and the expressions above, is implied by
αβ[(1−ℓ)(∆r(H)−pH) + (1−s)(r(H,0)−r(L,0)−ℓpH)] − ℓ(1−s)η
≤ β[(1−ℓ+(1−s)ℓ2)∆r(H)−pH)−(1−ℓ)pH]
+ β(1−s)[(1+sℓ)(r(H,0)−r(L,0))+ℓr(L,0)].
42Note that ℓpH ≤ r(H,0)−r(L,0) is guaranteed when ℓ(r(H,1)−r(H,0)) ≤
r(H,0) − r(L,0).
Part 2. For the second part suppose the appropriate condition of (21) and
(23) holds, i.e. a jungle is stable in t + 1.
(i) Consider ℓ > s. Let condition (21) hold. Then a jungle is stable in t+1,
which in turn implies that a market is stable in t + 2. By (21) a jungle is











That a jungle is stable in t + 1 implies that
Et+2(ω) = αEt+1(ω) + η
+ β(ℓ[sr(H,1)+(1−s)r(L,1)] + (1−ℓ)[sr(H,0)+(1−s)r(L,0)]), and
Et+2(ω|ω<ˆ ωt+2) = αEt+1(ω<ˆ ωt+1) + β(sr(H,0) + (1−s)r(L,0)) + η.
By assumption markets are stable in t, which implies as above that
Et+1(ω) = αEt(ω) + β(sr(H,1)+ (ℓ−s)r(L,1) + (1−ℓ)r(L,0)) + η and
Et+1(ω|ω<ˆ ωt+1) ≤ αEt(ω|ω<ˆ ωt) + η
+ β(sr(H,1)+(ℓ−s)(r(L,1)+(1−ℓ)r(L,0)).
Moreover, by assumption condition (21) holds:












s∆r(H,.) + ℓ(∆r(L) − (1 − s)pL) + ℓr(L,0)
]
+ (1 + α)sη. (26)
This condition holds for instance when α is suﬃciently large, or if both s
and r(L,0) are suﬃciently close to 0.
(ii) Suppose now ℓ < s and that condition (23) holds, so that
αEt(ω) + β[(1−sℓ)(r(H,1) − r(H,0)) − (1−ℓ)pH
+(1−s2)r(H,0) − s(1−s)r(L,0)] + (1 − s)η ≤ sαEt(ω|ω>ˆ ωt). (27)
Using (16) and (22), a jungle is stable in period t + 3 if
αEt+2(ω) + β
(
r(H,1) − (1 − ℓ)pH)
+ η < sEt+3(ω|ω>ˆ ωt+3). (28)
43Note here that the identity of the strong (ωi > ˆ ω) agents does not change
over time, i.e. ωi,t+1 > ˆ ωt+1 implies ωi,t+j > ˆ ωt+j, j = 2,3 since all the rent
goes to the sellers on a market, see Proposition 7. Therefore
Et+3(ω|ω>ˆ ωt+3) =αEt+2(ω|ω>ˆ ωt+2) + η
+ β(ℓr(H,1) + (s−ℓ)r(H,0) + (1−s)r(L,0) + (1−ℓ)pH).
A jungle as a stable outcome in t + 1 implies that
Et+2(ω) = αEt+1(ω) + η
+ β(ℓ[sr(H,1) + (1−s)r(L,1)] + (1−ℓ)[sr(H,1) + (1−s)r(L,1)]), and
Et+2(ω|ω>ˆ ωt+2) = αEt+1(ω|ω>ˆ ωt+1) + β(sr(H,1) + (1−s)r(L,1)) + η.
As above assuming markets are stable in t implies that
Et+1(ω) = αEt(ω) + β(ℓr(H,1) + (s − ℓ)r(H,0) + (1 − s)r(L,0)) + η and
Et+1(ω|ω>ˆ ωt+1) ≥ αEt(ω|ω>ˆ ωt) ´+ η
+ β(ℓr(H,1)+(s−ℓ)r(H,0)+(1−s)r(L,0)).
Using these expressions and (27) on (28), a suﬃcient condition for a jungle
in t + 3 is
αβ ((1−ℓ)[sr(H,0) + (1−s)r(L,0)] − (s−ℓ)[sr(H,1) + (1−s)r(L,1)])
<β
(






This condition holds for α suﬃciently great or s suﬃciently close to 1.
Optimal Coalitional Expropriation
The following lemma characterizes the optimal coalitional expropriation to
attack markets:
Lemma 2 (Optimal Coalitional Expropriation) There is an optimal
coalitional expropriation (λ′,0) characterized by
• if ℓ < s: λ′
i=1 if ωi>  ω and λ0
i =0 or λ0
i =1 and θi=H,
• if ℓ > s: λ′
i=1 if ωi>  ω and λ0
i =1 or λ0
i =0 and θi=L, or if ωi>  ω/2
and λi=0 and θi=H,
with   ω implicitly deﬁned by µ(i ∈ I : λ′
i = 1) = l ∨   ω = 0.
44Proof: Note that u(λ0
i,θi,λM
i ,p) < u(λ0
i,θi,λ′
i,0) if and only if λ′
i = 1
and λ0
i = 0. u(λ0
i,θi,λM
i ,p) > u(λ0
i,θi,λ′
i,0) if and only if λ′
i = 0 and λ0
i = 1,
or λ′
i = 0 and λ0
i = 0, but p < r(θi,1), or λ′
i = 1 and λ0
i = 1, but p > r(θi,1).
Deﬁne accordingly the coalitions of winners and losers
C ={i ∈ I : λ′
i<λ0
i =1} ∪ {i ∈ I : λ′
i=λ0
i =0 ∧ p<r(θi,1)}
∪ {i ∈ I : λ′
i=λ0
i =1 ∧ p>r(θi,1)},
C′ ={i ∈ I : λ′>λ0
i}.






















Agent i’s marginal contribution to the objective function ∆(i) of receiving
land λ′
i = 1 (as opposed to λ′
i = 0) is
∆(i) =

      
      
0 if i ∈ C for λ′
i = 0,λ′
i = 1
0 if i ∈ C′ for λ′
i = 0,λ′
i = 1
ωi if i ∈ C for λ′
i = 0,i / ∈ C′,i / ∈ C for λ′
i = 1
ωi if i / ∈ C,i / ∈ C′ for λ′
i = 0,i ∈ C′ for λ′
i = 1
2ωi if i ∈ C for λ′
i = 0,i ∈ C′ for λ′
i = 1.
All other cases can be excluded. Since the constraint binds with equality, in
the optimal coalitional expropriation λ′
i = 1 if ∆(i) >   ω, with   ω : µ(i ∈ I :
∆(i) ≥   ω) = ℓ ∨   ω = 0. Conditioning on scarcity of land the statement in
the lemma follows.
Figure 1 shows the optimal expropriation for ℓ > s where λ′ is the land
distribution under expropriation.
A market allocation is the unique stable outcome if the market dominates













in case ℓ > s and therefore p = pL. Otherwise, if ℓ < s the condition is
∫ e ω
ω






























i = 0, θi = θH
Agents with λi = 1, θi = θL
Agents with λi = 1, θi = θH
Agents with λ0
i = 0, θi = θL
e ω/2 ˆ ω e ω ω
λ′=0 ← → λ′=1
λ′=0 ← → λ′=1
λ′=0 ← → λ′=1
λ′=0 ← → λ′=1
Figure 1: Optimal coalitional expropriation when ℓ > s.
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